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ABSTRACT
Enterprise’s computers that are connected to the 
Internet are often targets for attacks and need to be 
protected. Using sensors, a network security 
monitoring system can collect traffic patterns from 
different locations in the network, analyze them and 
give indications of possible network attacks. 
However, it is still not clear how a sensor can be 
designed and how can the sensors be managed. This 
paper presents an approach for modeling a security 
monitoring sensor within an enterprise’s network. We 
present an overall architecture of a sensor as well as a 
model for anomaly traffic behaviour detection and 
show possible applications to anomaly traffic 
detection and quality of service monitoring. 
Index Terms – Network Security Monitoring, 
Anomaly Traffic Detection, Quality of Service 
Monitoring. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Almost operations of enterprises are currently based 
on the network infrastructure. A lot of enterprise’s 
information assets are now stored, processed and 
transported over networks. Attacks to these 
information assets are always attractive targets of 
hackers, either to steal information data or disturb the 
operations of enterprises. 
The unsecured nature of network environment as well 
as information systems is due to the necessity for 
sharing and exchanging information over networks. 
Thus, protecting information assets becomes more 
critical.
Many solutions for information security have been 
proposed including firewalls, intrusion detection 
tools, malware scanning tools, etc. However, we can 
not only rely on these technologies due to their 
limitations. The major problem of these approaches is 
that they fail to detect new or unknown attacks.  
More proactive approaches are necessary in order to 
be able to early detect attacks.
Network security monitoring is one of the proactive 
solutions. Until now there are several security 
monitoring frameworks that have been proposed, 
either based on open-source software or commercial 
closed software. Due to the complexity and variety of 
network security systems, it is difficult for enterprises 
to choose a suitable solution and to deploy them 
according to the individual needs of enterprises. 
In generality, a network security monitoring system 
uses sensors to collect traffic data from the network, 
analyzes them and gives indication of possible 
network attacks. However, it is still not clear how a 
sensor can be designed and how can the sensors be 
deployed. 
In the most cases, sensors implement intrusion 
detection mechanisms to detect known attacks based 
on signature match [1,2]. These mechanisms can not 
generalize the unknown attacks as indicated above. 
Recently, several other works have been focused on 
data mining approaches [3,4,5,22]. These models try 
to build detection models with and without signatures. 
They apply data mining algorithms for large data sets 
that are collected from a network.  
However, it is very difficult to generate required data 
for training process and for building pattern detection 
models due to the dynamic of the traffic streams. 
Accuracy, efficiency and usability are three remaining 
difficulties for the design of intrusion detection 
mechanisms.  
In this paper, we present the overall architecture of a 
sensor as well as a model for anomaly traffic 
behaviour detection using data mining approach. We 
show different possible applications of the model to 
anomaly traffic detection and quality of service 
monitoring. 
2. NETWORK MONITORING 
Intrusion detection methods 
Intrusion detection is a core problem in any network 
security monitoring system. Intrusion detection is 
aimed to collect traffic data, to analyze them to detect 
attacks by examining data and differentiating between 
normal traffic and malicious traffic (anomaly traffic). 
Typical network monitoring systems have been 
developed until now including open source systems 
such as Automated Incident Reporting (Air CERT) 
[6], Correlated Intrusion Detection System [7], 
Monitoring, Intrusion Detection and Administration 
System [8], Sguil[9], Prelude[10], SiLK[11], OSSIM 
[12]… 
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Typically, these systems collect data from sensors, i.e. 
some software or hardware equipment which 
monitors some parts of the network. Sensors gather 
data, evaluate them and produce patterns for attack 
detection. There are usually two methods for data 
collecting using sensors: passive (or indirect) and 
active (direct). Data collection may be in real-time or 
using sampling method. 
There are basically two principles for intrusion 
detection: signature-based detection (back list) and 
anomaly detection (white list). 
Signature-based detection 
This method is based on modelling known attacks. 
Sensors collect data from raw traffic streams being 
monitored and produce data patterns for detection. 
Detection algorithm compare sensor data to known 
attack patterns learned from the training data. If the 
collected patterns match known attacks patterns, the 
collected patterns can be considered as intrusion. The 
comparison is usually done for dependent time data 
series over a number of sources and protocols, in 
order to produce true positive decision. However, the 
price to paid for this method is that the data set for 
known attack patterns should be large enough [3]. 
The solution is not effective and needs much time for 
comparison. 
Anomaly behaviour detection 
Most of anomaly detection methods try to model 
normal behaviour of traffic (white list). Normal traffic 
patterns should learn from training data and the 
detection algorithm compare collected data from 
sensors to these normal patterns. If a mismatch is 
detected, the collected data is considered as from 
possible intrusion attacks. Examples of anomaly may 
be such as anomaly increase of traffic, or access to 
unallowed ports. This method is popular due to the 
possibility to detect unknown or new attacks 
[4,13,14]. However, as same as signature-based 
detection, it needs a large set of training data for 
comparison. 
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN OF 
MONITORING SENSORS 
3.1. Components of a security monitoring system 
Enterprise’s networks are different depending on the 
use, necessary services, network topology, etc. 
However, they have common basic components such 
as: central system (webserver, mail server, DNS), 
internal links through switches and hubs, external 
links to Internet Services Providers. 
In generality, a security monitoring system consists of 
two main components: data collection subsystems and 
monitoring center (see Figure 1). 
Data Collection Subsystem 
Monitoring sensors are at different locations of the 
network including server system, routers, switch or at 
endsystems. The main task of sensors is to collect 
data patterns or events from traffic streams and 
transfer them to the monitoring center. 
Sensors may include traffic filters which are used to 
reduced the processing data. Beside of collection 
function, sensors can have detection function in order 
to reduce the collected traffic data as well as to 
transfer only true positive traffic data, i.e. intrusion 
patterns, to monitoring center (see 3.2 for details).  
Monitoring Center 
Monitoring center receives data patterns from sensors, 
stores them in a database, provides data for further 
analysis, e.g. correlation analyze, and performs other 
necessary functions such as statistical analyze, alarm 
generation, intrusion attack visualization, etc. 
Figure 1 Security Monitoring System 
3.2. Design of a Sensor 
Figure 2 describes the internal design of a sensor. In 
this case, a sensor is a computer with the following 
requirements: Intel x86 compatible CPU, Processor 
speed at least 1 GHz, minimum 1 GBytes RAM, 
HDD with minimum 1 GBytes free space, two 
network interfaces 10/100/1000 Mbps where eth0 is 
used for traffic data collection and eth1 for 
connection to monitoring center. 
Figure 2 Internal Design of a Sensor 
Sensor Software links the packet capture component 
to software tools, communicates with monitoring 
center through management interface. Sensor 
software can use a set of current popular open sources 
such as Snort, Ntop, Nagios, p0f, arpwatch, etc. [15]. 
Sensors have the following main functions: 
+ Monitoring Traffic streams 
+ Collecting traffic data  
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+ Detecting intrusion signatures and anomaly traffic 
behaviours. 
4.1.
+ Storing traffic patterns / intrusion patterns. 
+ Managing configuration of various tools. 
+ Providing interface and functions for sensor 
management. 
4.  MODEL FOR ANOMALY TRAFFIC 
BEHAVIOUR DETECTION 
As discussed in section 1 and 2 before, intrusion 
detection is the key element in any security 
monitoring system. We also described that our 
sensors rely mainly on anomaly traffic detection for 
intrusion detection model. A question may arise how 
to design an effective intrusion detection model. 
Most of intrusion detection models until now require 
data patterns for training process in order to compare 
the collected traffic data patterns to data patterns 
learned from training. Most of the models require 
“clean data” for training, that means data patterns of 
normal traffic should not include any intrusion traffic. 
In practice, it is difficult and expensive to produce 
such “clean” data patterns. 
On the other hand, it should be reasonable, if data 
patterns for training should be produced directly from 
the network environment within the network to be 
monitored. 
Therefore, a reasonable detection model should take 
into account the presence of noisy data, i.e. a small 
portion of “unclean” data together with normal traffic 
data. This small portion is considered as anomaly 
traffic. The detection model should adapt to this 
condition and provide usable deployment. 
Several detection models based on data mining have 
been proposed in the past. The model in [16] makes 
use of log-files for anomaly detection algorithm and 
compares the probability of new coming traffic to 
probability of traffic recorded in the log-file. A 
mismatch indicates a possible intrusion. If no 
comparable traffic patterns is present in the log-file, 
the detection model could not work. 
An adaptive intrusion detection method was proposed 
in [17]. This method uses influent pattern series for 
online detection. An expert system has been proposed 
to improve the method by collecting data from audit 
sources. Other method use continuous time series of 
successive packet pairs [18]. The author in [19,21] 
proposed to detect the frequency of occurrence of 
anomaly data streams in comparison to normal data 
streams. An expert system was proposed [20] using 
audit data for detection. A survey and comparison of 
intrusion detection methods was given in [4]. 
In the following paragraphs, we present an adaptive
model for sensor with intrusion detection based on 
anomaly traffic behaviour detection in noisy traffic 
environment following the idea in [14] with some 
modifications and extension. 
Components of Adaptive Detection Model 
Our adaptive detection model consists of 3 modules: 
capture module, adaptive pattern generator, detection 
module (Figure 3). 
The capture module collects traffic data patterns and 
sends them to the detection module for analyzing and 
intrusion pattern detecting. It also sends captured 
traffic data to the adaptive pattern generator for 
training new traffic patterns. The adaptive pattern 
generator is composed of: pattern receiver, pattern 
generator, pattern database and pattern distributor 
(see Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Adaptive Detection Model 
The pattern receiver gets traffic data from capture 
module, i.e. from sensors on the monitoring network, 
converts data, stores them to the pattern database. 
Using pattern database queries, the set of training data 
pattern is produced for pattern generator. With 
training data from pattern database, the pattern 
generator builds pattern and provides them to pattern 
distributor, which are used by detection module. This 
method could be applied to any sensor device. 
Capture module may get raw traffic data during the 
time the sensor monitors traffic streams on the 
network. 
4.2.
4.3.
Pattern Database 
By storing collected traffic pattern from sensor in the 
database, we can freely access to any subset of pattern 
data with only unique query. Depending on various 
intrusion attacks, pattern database is needed to 
provide different pattern for training data. For 
instance, in case of intrusion detection based on 
information of system calls, we can easily model the 
system calls to provide suitable detection patterns. 
The detection algorithm can access patterns for 
system calls using a database query. 
Pattern Generator and Pattern Distributor 
We can apply any pattern generator for the model, for 
example the pattern database can provide training 
data as an input to a learning module. Whenever the 
pattern generator learned from training data and 
generates new pattern, they are sent to detection 
module by pattern distributor. 
Two issues should be considered. Firstly, pattern 
generator should be able to process noisy data, i.e. 
data inclusive intrusion signatures. Secondly, the 
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detection module should be able to change detection 
pattern during the time. This ability determines the 
real-time detection possibility of the sensor. 
One way to effectively implement pattern generator 
and pattern distributor in practice is to use distributed 
system. Various pattern generators and pattern 
distributors are distributed on different end systems. 
By this way, we can reduce the use of processing 
resources.
4.4. Anomaly Traffic Behaviour Detection under 
Noisy Condition 
In practice, it is very difficult to guarantee “clean” 
traffic data by data capturing and to generate “clean” 
data pattern for intrusion detection. Therefore, the 
model should work under noisy condition, i.e. a 
mixture of normal data and anomaly data [14]. For a 
large set of traffic data, it is reasonable to consider 
statistical approach. 
We can assume that intrusion patterns are only a 
small set in comparison to large set of normal traffic 
data. The problem becomes to detect anomaly 
behaviour within a traffic data set using statistical 
method. Pattern database may include both “clean 
pattern” and “unclean pattern”. That is the database is 
a mixture of normal traffic data and intrusion data. 
Learning method will be applied to train the detection 
module over collected data in order to calculate the 
probability distribution of traffic data. 
Under assumption of a small set of anomaly traffic 
behaviour data, we can assume that most of the 
collected data patterns are normal. 
For each data pattern collected, two possibilities may 
happen: normal data pattern and anomaly data 
pattern. 
Denote the probability of valid data pattern, i.e. data 
pattern belonging to normal traffic as PB. Denote the 
probability of invalid data pattern, i.e. data pattern 
belonging to anomaly traffic as P
B
A.  We have: 
PB = (1-)B
 PA = 
Where  is the probability of anomaly traffic. 
For any total traffic data set W, we also have a set of 
normal traffic data B and a set of anomaly traffic A. 
     W = PB.B + PB A.A = (1 - ). B +  . A          (1) 
The set W can be called as mixture set of the model, 
indicates the presence of anomaly traffic (noisy) in 
the set of data collected by sensors. This set depends 
on the probability of B and A. Each element xi of this 
set W can include elements of A and B generated by 
the probabilities PA and PB.B
Accordingly, we can denote BBi and Ai as the set of 
normal pattern elements and the set of anomaly 
pattern elements, respectively, at a time t, after an 
element xi of set W has been processed, where i
denotes element index and i=1 to N.  
Assume that at the time of begin, no anomaly traffic 
occurs. The initial set of anomaly traffic A is then 
empty, and we have: 
     A0 =  and B0 = W           (2) 
In our model, anomaly traffic behaviour detection is 
equivalent to determine which elements are generated 
by probability distribution A and which elements are 
generated by probability distribution B. Elements 
generated by probability distribution A is considered 
as anomaly and elements generated by probability 
distribution B is considered as normal. These 
elements can be considered as independent statistical 
variables. 
The detection algorithm can be formulated as follows: 
for each element xi of set W (set of collected data 
pattern), we should determine whether it is normal or 
anomaly. It will be move to the set At+1 if it is 
anomaly and moved to the set BBt+1 if it is normal. 
The probability of W at a time t is as follows: 
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From (1), (3), (4) and (5) we have: 
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Where N = N1+N2
N1 is set of data elements generated by probability 
distribution of B at time t, N2 is set of data elements 
generated by probability distribution of B at time t.
Equation (6) can be written in form of logarithm as 
follows: 
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From the initial condition (2) and from (6), we get: 
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By the assumption that anomaly traffic behaviours 
occur with a small set, i.e.  is smaller than 1-, we 
can conclude: at any time t, each change in 
probability of the data pattern set of anomaly traffic 
has a small influence on the 
change of P
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change of P
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By applying the Mahalonobis distance method or the 
Cook distance method [23], we can suggest a 
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predefined parameter c and calculate the ratio of 
probabilities Pt(W)/ Pt-1(W) for two successive times 
t-1 and t.
If the ratio Pt(W)/ Pt-1(W) >c, the element xi under
consideration can be seen as anomaly traffic data 
element and will be moved from the set of normal 
data pattern B to the set of anomaly data pattern A. In 
the similar way, we repeat the calculation of 
probability ratio Pt(W)/ Pt-1(W) for all data elements xi
in the traffic data set W. 
With the assumption that the probability for receiving 
an anomaly traffic pattern xi is , the probability for 
receiving a normal traffic pattern xj is 1–, we can 
calculate the entropy for the set of anomaly traffic 
data E(A) and for the set of normal traffic data E(B) as 
follows: 
 
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From (7), (9), and (10), we get: 
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For small set of anomaly traffic behaviour, i.e.  is 
more smaller than 1– as indicated above, we can 
have the approximation of (11) as follows: 
 

 )(1log.)(log 1
AENWPt 		
From (12) we can see that, one way to determine the 
probability ratio Pt(W)/ Pt-1(W) for all data elements xi
in the traffic data set W is to determine the change of 
entropy E(A) of the data set A. If the entropy E(A) of 
the data set A at a time t is smaller than the one at 
time t-1, the element xi under consideration can be 
seen as anomaly traffic data element. 
4.5. Application of the Model to Quality of Service 
Monitoring
In this section, we show that the model can be easily 
extended for quality of service monitoring. Let we 
model the outlier of normal traffic as anomaly traffic, 
we can determine the probability of bursts of traffic 
data. By this way, we can determine the congestion 
signature as an anomaly behaviour of the normal 
traffic, i.e. the percentage of outlier throughput in 
comparison with normal throughput. If the delay of 
packets is considered, packets with delay larger than a 
threshold can be treated as anomaly traffic. 
Determining the burst of traffic 
Let Pt(A) denotes the occurred traffic burst at time t,
let n the set of traffic data belonging to the traffic 
burst,  is the probability that the data pattern xi is 
belonging to the traffic burst, we have: 
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In analogy, with Pt(A) the normal traffic, m the set of 
normal traffic, we have: 
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If we assume that the incoming traffic follows 
poisson distribution with the expected rate k, k is the 
number of data patterns within the burst, we can have 
a simple form for anomaly traffic, i.e. the traffic burst 
as follows: 
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Determining the violation of packet delay 
Let Pt(A) denotes the probability of delayed packets at 
time t, let n the set of packets experienced a delay 
larger than D,  is the probability that the collected 
packets is belonging to the this set. Assume that the 
incoming traffic follows exponential distribution with 
the expected rate , we have: 
(9)
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For example, if  = 0.1, n = 1 (considering one 
individual packet), we have: (12)
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Figure 4 and 5 show the probability distributions of 
Pt(A) and Pt(W), respectively.
Figure 4 Probability distribution of P(A)
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Figure 5 Probability distribution of P(W) 
5. EXPERIMENT 
This section presents an experiment to demonstrate 
the design and deployment of our sensors. In this 
experiment [24] we use one monitoring center with IP 
address 192.168.5.70. Four sensors with IP addresses 
192.168.70.5, 192.168.0.120, 192.168.5.61, 192.168. 
5.131. The computer 192.168.70.1 generates intrusion 
traffic.
Figure 6 shows the normal traffic behaviour on our 
experiment network in every time frame of 10 
minutes. Figure 7 shows anomaly traffic behaviour 
generated by the intrusion computer. In the Figure 7, 
we can see a burst of traffic (anomaly) due to the 
severe requests of the remote attack computer. 
Figure 6 Normal traffic load 
Figure 7 Anomaly traffic detection 
6. CONCLUSION
The paper discussed the problem of design and 
deployment of a security monitoring sensor. We 
presented an overall architecture of a sensor as well 
as an adaptive model for anomaly traffic behaviour 
detection using data mining approach. The paper 
showed analytical results for the model and 
demonstrated different possible applications of the 
outlier detection model to anomaly traffic detection 
and quality of service monitoring. Further works can 
focus on investigating the performance of the outlier 
detection model and its applications. 
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